Recent widening of the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers has been attributed mainly to skill-biased-technical-change and to trade liberalization. This paper examines the effects of the two in a unified model, in which trade and technology adoption are endogenous. The paper has two main results. First, technical progress increases the wage gap in developed and in less developed countries, while trade liberalization increases the wage gap in developed countries but reduces it in less developed countries. The second result is that while trade liberalization increases trade in all countries, technical progress does not increase trade everywhere. These two results indicate that the recent increase in wage inequality is a combined result of both technical progress and trade liberalization, and cannot be attributed to one factor only. 
Introduction
In recent decades we have seen a dramatic increase in wage inequality in the US. A similar, though smaller, increase has been observed in other countries. This phenomenon has been documented in many studies, including Davis and Haltwinger (1991) , Katz and Murphy (1992) , Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) , and Davis (1992) and recently in Goldin and Katz (1999) . A number of explanations have been offered to this rise in wage inequality. The most popular explanations are skill-biased technical progress on the one hand and the liberalization of international trade on the other hand.
1 This paper examines the two explanations together within a unified theoretical model, in which technical progress and trade liberalization are exogenous, while technology adoption, the pattern of trade and wages are endogenous. Our main result is that neither exogenous change alone can account for the stylized facts of the recent decades, while both can together. Hence, the paper suggests that the rise in wage inequality is a result of both skill-biased technical change and trade liberalization.
2
The paper presents a model in which the final good is produced by use of many intermediate goods.
Technological innovations in this model enable producers to replace unskilled workers in production of some intermediate goods by fewer skilled workers. Hence, technical progress replaces one input by a second. This has two results. The first is that technology adoption increases demand for skilled workers and at the same time also reduces demand for unskilled workers. Hence, technology adoption increases the wage ratio between the two types of workers. The second result is that such innovations are not everywhere adopted by producers, and adoption depends on input prices, namely on the wage ratio between skilled and unskilled produced by skilled or unskilled labor. Note that this independence is only with respect to the exogenous change in trade, namely to liberalization, but the endogenous reaction of trade is affected by technical progress. 4 We find that the results of the model are very different with respect to developed and less developed countries. In developed countries both technical progress and trade liberalization increase wage inequality. In less developed countries technical progress increases wage inequality, though by less, but trade liberalization reduces wage inequality rather than increases it. These results imply that recent developments cannot be attributed solely to trade liberalization, since wage inequality has increased not only in developed countries but in less developed countries as well, as shown in Berman, Bound and (1998) and many other studies.
The model also enables us to examine the effect of exogenous changes not only on wages but on trade as well. We show that technical progress raises the relative amount of trade in one country but reduces it in the other country. This result is at odds with the stylized facts of recent decades. We have seen a rise in the share of trade in income in all countries, developed as well as less developed. Hence, the recent changes in wage inequality and in trade volume cannot be attributed only to skill-biased technical progress. We, therefore, conclude that both factors, technical progress and trade liberalization, must have played important roles in the widening of wage inequality in developed countries.
Finally the paper examines the effect of changes in labor supplies on the equilibrium wages and trade. This is interesting for two reasons. First, because labor supplies tend to react to changes in relative wages, which supply incentive to invest more or less in human capital, namely in skill acquisition. Second, recently Goldin and Katz (1999) and Card and Lemiux (1999) have presented a third possible explanation to the widening of the wage gap: decline in supply of skill. We examine this explanation within our model and show that even when it holds, trade liberalization still plays a role in increasing wage inequality.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model, while section 3 analyzes equilibrium in a closed economy and focuses on technology adoption and wage determination. Section 4 analyzes equilibrium in global trade model with two countries. Section 5 examines the effect of technical progress and trade liberalization on wage inequality. Section 6 examines the effects of changes in labor supplies and section 7 concludes.
The Model
Consider an economy with one final good, which is used for consumption only. The final good is produced by use of a continuum of intermediate goods [0, 1] . Production of the final good is described by the following Cobb-Douglas production function:
( While in this paper we concentrate on increases in f, the standard view of skilled biased technical progress is an increase of productivity of skilled workers in all their jobs. In this model it is equivalent to a reduction of s i for all i, namely an increase of g.
We discuss such a change in Section .
We next turn to describe labor supply of both types of workers. We leave the full specification of individuals and of skill acquisition to a later stage in the analysis.
For the meanwhile we only assume that in each period t the supplies of skilled and unskilled workers are predetermined. There is a mass off size S t of skilled workers and a mass of size N t of unskilled workers. We also assume that each worker supplies one unit of labor in one period of time. Hence, the supplies of both types of labor are assumed to be perfectly inelastic in the short-run. This assumption is later relaxed in 
Trade openness in this economy is therefore characterized by the amount of traded goods. This measure differs from standard ones, such as size of barriers to trade, but is employed here as it fits the model better and it yields similar results to the standard measures. We further assume that there are two countries in the world, A and B.
Equilibrium in a Closed Economy
We first consider an economy which is closed to international trade, namely the set M 
Hence, the wage ratio between skilled and unskilled workers determines technology adoption. This variable, which describes wage inequality in the economy, is the main variable in our analysis and is called the wage ratio. It is easy to see that the set of adopted technologies is [0, d]∩F, where:
We can, therefore, distinguish between two cases. In the first case d = 1 and all the existing skilled technologies are adopted. In the second case d < 1 and not all technologies are adopted. The first case prevails when w s /w n ≤ g (1), and the second prevails when w s /w n > g(1). We say that the higher is d the more 'developed' the country is. We sometimes call a country that adopts all technologies 'fully developed'.
We next turn to the goods markets to describe price determination. Due to perfect competition in output and input markets and to the Cobb-Douglas technology we get the following first order condition:
Due to perfect competition in input markets and due to constant marginal productivity we get:
In order to describe wage determination we turn to the equilibrium conditions in the two labor markets in the economy, omitting time subscripts as the equilibrium is temporal. Equilibrium in the market for skilled labor is reached when supply equals demand and due to (8) and (9) we get:
. Similarly, the equilibrium condition in the market for unskilled labor is:
From (10) and (11) we get:
The right hand side of equation (12), which describes the wage ratio and which we denote by WR, is an increasing function of d. Furthermore, WR depends positively on the state of technology f and on the relative supplies of skilled and unskilled workers.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
The equilibrium wage ratio and the level of technology adoption d in the closed economy are determined by equations (7) and (12). The equilibrium is described in Figure 1 at the intersection of the WR curve and the g curve. There are two possible equilibria. If the educational system is sufficiently large and there are many skilled workers, as described by point A in Figure 1 , all new innovations are adopted and the economy is fully developed. If on the contrary the education system is small and there are few skilled workers and many unskilled workers, the equilibrium is described by point B in Figure 1 . In this case some of the new technological innovations, those between d and 1, are not adopted, and the economy is what we call less developed.
To complete the description of equilibrium we derive the absolute wage levels of skilled and unskilled workers. From the first order condition (8) and from the production function (1) we get:
By substituting (9) and the wage ratio (12) in equation (13) we can calculate the wage of skilled workers:
and the wage of unskilled workers: (15) . log ) ( log log 1 log log
We next turn to analyze the effect of technical progress on equilibrium in the closed economy. An increase in f shifts the WR curve upward and thus raises the wage ratio. Note that if the economy is fully developed, the effect of an increase in f is larger than in a less developed economy. In a fully developed country the wage ratio rises by the full amount of the increase in the WR curve. In a less developed economy it rises by less, due to the downward slope of g. Note also, that although d decreases or remains unchanged when f rises, the amount of intermediate goods produced by skilled workers increases, since df increases as can be seen from (12). It can be shown that a rise in f increases skilled wage w s while it has an ambiguous effect on the wage of unskilled.
World Trade Equilibrium
As assumed in Section 2 there are two large economies. Economy A has a large amount of skilled workers S A and a small amount of unskilled labor N A . Economy A adopts all technologies up to an intermediate good d A , which might also be equal to 1.
Economy B on the contrary has a small amount of skilled labor S B and a large amount Lemma 1: Wages in the two countries satisfy: w sA ≤ w sB and w nA ≥ w nB and one of the inequalities is strict.
Proof: Note first, that it is impossible that both inequalities are violated, since then the wage ratio in A is higher than in B, which contradicts greater technology adoption in A. A similar argument can be used to show that the two equalities are impossible.
We next show that if only one inequality is violated, for example if w sA > w sB , we reach a contradiction as well. Consider two possible cases for unskilled wages. If w nB < w nA then country A is importing all goods from country B, which is impossible.
If w nB = w nA the wage ratio in country A is higher than in country B, which contradicts the assumption. Hence, both wage inequalities hold.
QED.
From Lemma 1 we conclude that country A is exporting intermediate goods 
A. Equilibrium with Full Specialization
We first analyze the case of full specialization, where skilled wages in A are strictly lower than in B. In this case all the input of traded skilled goods in B is supplied by A.
Since global trade must be balanced and we get:
From this condition and from (20) we can derive the ratio of incomes in the two countries:
Hence, the income ratio depends negatively on k.
We next present the four labor market equilibrium conditions. The equilibrium condition for skilled labor in A is:
[ , ]
The equilibrium condition in the market for non-skilled labor in A is:
Similarly, the equilibrium in the market for skilled labor in B is reached at: Equations (23) and (24) together with the condition on technology adoption (7) determine the equilibrium in each economy, i.e. the degrees of technology adoption and the wage ratio in each country. Note, that the right hand side of equation (23) Figure 3 . Similarly, the right hand side of (24), which is denoted WR B , is increasing in d B and hence has a unique intersection with g, which determines the equilibrium in B.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
We next turn to determination of equilibrium k and the pattern of international trade. From the labor market conditions and from the income ratio we derive the ratio between skilled wage in the developed economy and non-skilled wage in the less developed economy: This condition together with the trade condition (18) determines k. Since the right hand side of (25) is an increasing function of k it has a unique intersection with g. This intersection determines k and thus the pattern of trade. To ensure that this is a full specialization equilibrium, k needs to be strictly smaller than d A and strictly larger than
The conditions for that can be found by a straightforward calculation.
B. Equilibrium without Full Specialization in Skilled Goods
When the wages of skilled workers are equal in the two countries county B also produces some of the traded skilled goods in [0, d B ] . Hence, the world trade equilibrium is:
where ex iA is export of i from A.
The equilibrium conditions of the four labor markets are derived in a similar way to that under full specialization. From these conditions and from (26) and by (7). We have therefore shown that in both cases (and in the third case as well)
an equilibrium exists and is unique, and we have fully characterized it.
The Effects of Technical Progress and of Trade Liberalization
We next examine how technical progress and trade liberalization affect the equilibrium in the developed and the less developed countries. We model technical progress as increasing f, i.e. increasing the set of inventions which enable production by skilled workers. We model trade liberalization by increasing m, i.e. increasing the set of traded goods. We first examine the effect of these changes in the full specialization equilibrium and then turn to an economy without full specialization of skilled goods.
In the full specialization case an increase in f increases WR A and thus shifts upward the WR A curve in figure 3. 
Hence, the effect of technical progress on the less developed country is smaller if it is less developed significantly. Note, that the higher the degree of technical progress f, the more likely it is that the effect on the less developed country is smaller, both due to the increase in f and due to the decline in d B .
Technical progress also affects the volume of international trade. As shown above, an increase in f increases both d A f and d B f as it increases the wage ratio in both countries. As can be seen from equation (25) an increase in f raises the right hand side and as a result it reduces k. Hence, technical progress reduces the range of products exported from developed to less developed countries. Furthermore, we can examine how technical progress affects the share of trade in both countries. From equation (21) it follows that the share of trade in country A is equal to m(1-kf), while in country B it is equal to mkf. Hence, whether technical progress increases kf or not, the share of trade in one of the countries, either in A or in B, declines as a result of skill-biased technical change. Note that this result does not fit the stylized facts of the recent decades. We know from many sources, such as Maddison (1995) and others, that the share of trade increased both in developed and in less developed countries. This result therefore means that the recent global increase in wage inequality cannot be explained only by skill-biased technical change.
We next turn to examine the effect of trade liberalization on wage inequality.
Here the difference between the two countries is dramatic. An increase in m shifts the WR A curve upwards in Figure 3 and thus reduces d A and increases the wage ratio.
Namely, trade liberalization increases wage inequality in the developed country, since it increases global demand for skilled workers in this country. In the less developed Therefore, the two countries become closer to one another as a result of more international trade.
As shown above, both skilled-biased technical progress and trade liberalization increase wage inequality. We next use the model to quantitatively compare these two effects. We compare the elasticities of WR A with respect to f and to m and get that: From equations (29) and (30) we learn also that the wage ratio is highly sensitive both to technical progress and to trade liberalization as the above elasticities are quite high.
If d A is equal to 1 and if f is higher than 1/2, then the elasticity of WR A with respect to f is higher than 1. A similar result holds with respect to m.
We next turn to examine the effects of technical progress and trade liberalization in the case of no specialization. We show that the results are similar to those under full specialization. Consider first the effect of an increase in f on the equilibrium in the two countries. Since the equilibrium in country A is the same as in full specialization, and is given by equations (7) and (23) 
Changes in Labor Supplies
Until this section we have assumed that the supplies of the two types of workers are given and fixed. In this section we study two possible changes in labor supply. Figure 3 shifts upward and the wage ratio rises with it. In country B this change has no effect at all, as can be seen from equation (24). The effect of changes in labor supplies on k is not clear, but the effect on the shares of trade in output is similar to the effect of skill-biased technical change. The share rises in one country and falls in the other. Hence, changes in relative labor supplies cannot be the only explanation to the widening wage gap in recent decades.
Next we extend the model to allow for labor supply adjustment to changes in the wage ratio. As the wage ratio rises more people invest in human capital and become skilled, due to an incentive effect. In order to capture this mechanism in the simplest way we assume that training decisions are so flexible, that the long-run equilibrium is reached instantaneously. Consider a version of the model, where individuals live one period each in consecutive generations. There is no population growth and each generation consists of a mass of size 1. Individuals have utility from consumption and disutility from the effort of learning. An individual can either work as unskilled, or study and work as skilled worker. Utility is
where c is consumption, e > 1 measures effort, and δ is equal to 1 if the individual invests in human capital and 0 if not. We assume that the effort needed to study and invest in skills differs across countries, as it embodies the difficulty of education and of skill acquisition, access to education and similar issues. We assume that individuals are free to choose between the two alternatives and as a result utility from the two careers must equal. Hence the wage ratio is Note, that if the education system has some frictions, and the amount of individuals who acquire skills depends on the existing amount of skilled workers in the economy, condition (32) is not reached instantaneously. Furthermore, the frictions in the education system can be such, that the economy might get stuck in a different equilibrium and never reach (32). 7 Our specification in this Section is, therefore, intended to present the steady state in an economy without traps and we do it by ignoring short-run dynamics and assuming that the economy moves to the steady state instantaneously.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
The equilibrium in each economy is presented in Figure 4 , where the wage ratio is not determined by demand for the two types of labor, as in the former sections, but by the labor supply condition (32). The equilibrium wage ratio determines the degree of technology adoption in each country d j . It also determines the amounts of skilled and unskilled workers in each country j by equations (27) and (28) and by the constraint: S j = 1-N j . These variables also determine k and the volume of international trade by equation (29).
Hence, the long-run wage ratio between skilled and unskilled workers is not affected by technical progress or by international trade, but by the access of individuals to education and skill acquisition, namely by the labor supply conditions.
The more costly education is, namely the higher e is, the higher the wage ratio in the country. Technical progress and international trade affect the amounts of workers of both types in the long-run, but not their relative wage. It can be shown that technical progress increases the amount of skilled workers in all countries, while trade liberalization increases the amount of skilled workers in the developed economy and reduces this amount in the less developed economy.
Conclusions
This paper constructs a theoretical model of skill-biased technical progress and of international trade in order to examine how the two processes together affect wage inequality in developed and less developed countries. One important final comment is that all the changes discussed above in wage inequality are due to changes in demand for labor and are therefore short-run in nature. As time passes younger agents react to changes in wages by acquiring skills and thus wages gaps tend to be reduced. Hence, the long-run determinants of wage inequality are neither technology nor trade, but rather the ability of young people to acquire education and skills. Namely, in the long-run wage gaps are determined by the supply of labor rather than by the demand for labor. 
